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Abstract: The tsunami caused by the Great East Japan Earthquake on 11 March 2011, with a 
magnitude of 9.0, caused catastrophic damage to people and buildings in the Tohoku and Kanto 
regions of Japan. A field survey was conducted to elucidate the damage to river embankments and their 
hinterlands (residential area) by tsunami propagation in river channels and overtopping of 
embankments. Three, three, and four rivers in Iwate Pref., Miyagi Pref., and the Kanto Region, 
respectively, were selected for the field investigation. In the hinterlands, the tsunami came from coast 
and river, and the situation, including the evacuation of people, became complex. Tsunami inundation 
patterns were classified by the river capacity and whether a river or sea embankment was breached or 
not. This will provide useful information for making new hazard maps and planning new cities. 
 
Keywords: tsunami propagation in river channels� �overtopping flow scoured region, erosion of 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The Great East Japan Earthquake at 14:46 JST on 11 March 2011 had a magnitude of 9.0 and an 
epicenter 129 km east of Sendai, and it was followed by a large tsunami that broke many of the sea 
walls (tsunami gates, large embankments)(Takahashi et al., 2011) and coastal forests (Tanaka, 2012), 
causing catastrophic damage to people and buildings in the Tohoku and Kanto regions of Japan. 
 
Tsunamis can cause catastrophic damage to both human life and socioeconomic property. Extensive 
experimental (Peregrine, 1967; Madsen & Mei, 1969) and analytical (Benjamin, 1972) studies have 
shown that tsunamis are also propagated far upstream in a straight channel of uniform depth and width 
because a solitary wave like a tsunami propagates without changing its shape and speed. In an actual 
tsunami, river morphology greatly affects the propagation. Although the propagation of solitary waves 
through curved shallow water channels was investigated by numerical simulations and the deformation 
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of the wave at the outer bank has been described (Shi et al., 1998; Yuhi et al., 2000), the disastrous 
results of propagation of an actual tsunami in a curved channel were not reported in previous research.  
 
In addition, it is very important to elucidate the role of inland embankments of roads, railways, and 
channels along the coast in mitigating the tsunami as it inundates the inland, and the relationship 
between the tsunami propagating from the sea and the flow overtopping the banks of a river. 
 
Therefore, the objectives of this study were: 1) to investigate the interactions between a tsunami 
propagating from the sea and the flow overtopping from a river, 2) to elucidate the effects of river 
morphology on the tsunami overtopping the embankment, and 3) to determine the effects of inland 
embankments on tsunami propagation in the hinterlands of the coast or river.   
For that objective, field investigations were conducted of three rivers (Heiigawa, Omotogawa and 
Sakarigawa Rivers) in Iwate Prefecture, three rivers (Abukumagawa, Old and New Kitakamigawa 
Rivers) in Miyagi Pref., and four rivers (Kujigawa, Nakagawa, Tonegawa, and Mikawa Rivers) in the 























Figure 1 Location of investigation sites (locations of the mouth of each investigated river are 
shown in this figure) 
2. SITE LOCATIONS AND MEASUREMENT METHOD  
Table 1 shows the river width at the river mouth, tsunami water depth, and height of the sea/river embankment 
at each investigation site. The tsunami water depth was obtained from "The 2011 Tohoku Earthquake Tsunami 
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Joint Survey Group" (http://www.coastal.jp/tsunami2011/). As for the tsunami damage, the width of sea/river 
embankments that were breached and the width/length of the regions that were scoured by overtopping flow 
are also shown in Table 1.  
 
The tsunami water depth at each site was determined by the height of scars made by collisions of debris with 
tree trunks or broken branches, water marks, e.g., collision traits, on the walls of damaged houses, marks on 
broken roofs, or debris located on roofs. The tsunami directions were analyzed by the directions trees and 
fences were bent and the location of broken houses and scour regions behind embankments or houses. In 
addition, estimated tsunami water depths of the river or on the embankment and that in the hinterlands were 
compared to judge the dominant tsunami direction. 

















Omotogawa River 200 6.9 9 4 0 230 70.0 - 100.014.0 - 15.0
Heiigawa River 160 8.9 - 3 - - - -
Sakarigawa River 150 9.3 4 3 0 0 3.5 - 15.0 2.5 - 6.0
New Kitakamigawa River 600 7.4 3 3 680 2100 3.0 - 39.0 2.0 - 5.0
Old Kitakamigawa River 200 7.3 4 3 - 0 15.0 4.0
Abukumagawa River 900 8.8 5 5 260 200 1.5 - 50.0 1.0 - 19.5
Kujigawa River 200 4.2 4 4 0 0 - -
Nakagawa River 300 3.3 3 3 0 0 - -
Tonegawa River 700 3.0 5 5 0 0 - -
Mikawa River 25 3.4 2 - 0 - - -
*Tsunami water depth data were obtained from "The 2011 Tohoku Earthquake Tsunami Joint Survey Group" (http://www.coastal.jp/tsunami2011/)
**The width and length of  regions scoured by overtopping flow are shown in Figure 2 
Scoured region due to
overtopping flow
Location Name of River
River width











3.1. Tsunami propagation and overtopping from river embankment (without 
tsunami gate at river mouth)  
The direction and water depths of the tsunami inundation around the Abukumagawa River are shown in 
Figure 2. At location A, breaching of the sea embankment was observed. Behind the sea embankment, large 
areas were scoured by the tsunami overtopping of sea embankment. Near this region, the tsunami water 
depth was around 5.5 m and the embankment height was 4.8 m. At location B, the overtopping water depth 
at the top of embankment was estimated to be around 1 m based on the debris attached to the fence on the 
embankment. Just downstream, the river embankment was also breached by direct attack of the tsunami. 
The overtopping from the river to the hinterland was severe at location C, but was a little less severe 
upstream at locations D and E. However, the overtopping became severe again at location F because it was 
located on the outer-bank side of the river. The extent of overflow was judged from the erosion of the river 
embankment slope and scoured regions around houses and the broken or washed-out condition of houses. 
The elevation of the road along the river was higher around location F than in locations D and E, so the 
difference between the ground level of houses and the road was greater. In location D and E, the road in front 
of houses had a role to prevent erosion, however location D, downward flow still continued and caused 
erosion. In that case, the overtopping flow caused scoring and local scour around houses that combined to 
generate large scour area (Figure 3). Thus, houses around location F were completely washed out, not by 
the tsunami propagated from seaward, but by the tsunami overtopping the river.  Similar overtopping from 
outer bank of a river was also observed in old Kitakamigawa River.  
 
In case of Heiigawa River (Figure 4), a railway bridge which is 1.5 km upstream from the river mouth was 
washed out after the damming of flow by debris including a ship (Location G). People who temporally 
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escaped on the railway embankment needed to escape far inland by the destruction of the bridge and railway. 
Most of the tsunami from seaside was stopped at the railway embankment (Location H), but tsunami also 
propagated by sewage pipe line, inundated in the inland region of the embankment, and overflown from the 
upstream river embankment when the railway bridge was broken. This case shows that; 1) bridge has some 
possibility to be a trigger of the overflow from embankment, and 2) tsunami also propagated from sewage line. 


































Figure 2 Damaged situation in Abukumagawa River Basin 
 




































Figure 4 Damaged situation in Heiigawa River Basin 
3.2. Change of tsunami propagation pattern with the tsunami gate at river 
mouth 
The Omotogawa River (Figure 5) has a tsunami gate and high sea embankment (around 10 m from the 
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ground on the hinterland side). The overtopping tsunami depth from sea embankment was assumed to 
around 1.6 m. Many large concrete blocks in front of the sea embankment had been transported by the 
tsunami, a large scoured region had been generated behind the sea embankment, and the pine trees near 
the region were overturned (Location I). Most of the houses near the sea and river embankment were 
washed out by the overtopping flow (Location J). From large scoured regions on floodplain of the river bed, 
and a scattered region of a broken parapet on the embankment, the breaching was supposed to be occurred 
from the inland side to the river. Even if a tsunami gate had existed, the tsunami would have been higher than 
the tsunami gate and the sea embankment; in fact, the tsunami inundation occurred mainly from the high 
embankment with high potential energy, and washed out or broke the houses. On contrary, in case of a small 
river in Chiba prefecture, the tsunami was stopped at the gate, because the tsunami height was low in 


























Figure 5 Damaged situation in Omotogawa River Basin 
3.3. Changes of tsunami inundation due presence of road, train embankment, 
sanitary channel, or mountain 
In case of the Sakarigawa River basin (Figure 6), the presence of a road and train embankment 
changed the direction of most of the tsunami flow intruded from seaward. The tsunami passed through 
only the culvert of the embankment from seaward to inland, but it continued to overtop the river 
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embankment. Thus, the people who lived upstream of the road and railway embankments received 
tsunami inundations from two directions. However, in this case, the tsunami overflow from river 
embankment itself was not large compared with that of the Abukumagawa River. The inland 
embankment for railway or road is very useful in some cases and needs to be utilized more, considering 
the tsunami inundation pattern.  
 
In the Kanto Region, the tsunami height was lower than that in the Tohoku area. The Kujigawa, 
Nakagawa, and Tonegawa Rivers had sufficient capacity to absorb the tsunami. Thus, the areas 
inundated by the propagated tsunami in the three rivers were restricted. Most of the tsunami intrusions 
occurred around branches of the river and drainage channels connected to the river. Even when a gate 
existed between main River and its branches, inundation was also occurred because the earthquake 
caused a gate trouble by an electricity failure of the system. In the Mikawa River, most of the tsunami 
was stopped by a sand dune on the coast, but the river itself was open to the sea and a tsunami could 
easily intrude into and overflow the hinterland from the river. This kind of problem in the gap of an 
embankment or vegetation barrier was already discussed (Mascarenhas and Jayakumar, 2008; Thuy et 
al., 2009; Tanaka, 2009, 2011). The river mouth problem is very difficult to mitigate because if a gate is 
constructed, it may change the tsunami inundation pattern, as in Omotogawa River when the tsunami 



















Figure 6 Damaged situation in Sakarigawa River Basin 
4. DISCUSSION  
As described in the previous section, overtopping of tsunami from the outer bank side of a river was 
severe. It is easily assumed from previous studies that the outer bank side is vulnerable to tsunami 
propagation (Shi et al., 1998; Yuhi et al., 2000). When overtopping occurred here, the scouring of roads 
in front of houses was not severe, and some houses remained standing although their walls were 
broken. In contrast, when the difference between the road height and the elevation of the house was 
large, the scouring became severe and the houses were washed out. The type of utilization of the 
riverside greatly affects the damage and needs to be studied in more detail in the future.  
 
If a river embankment is not high enough to obstruct a tsunami or a city has rivers or creeks, tsunami 
inundation occurs not only from the sea but also from the rivers or creeks. In the Old Kitakamigawa 
River (old channel), or the Sakarigawa River, the tsunami propagated in the river, which is usually faster 
than a tsunami propagating over land, and the water overflow hit people from two directions.  
 
Many patterns of tsunami propagation in rivers were observed, and they depended on 1) the river 
capacity (especially embankment height), 2) whether a river or coastal embankment was 
broken/breached or not, and 3) the existence of an inland embankment or area of high elevation, like a 
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mountain, near the river. For the evacuation from the tsunami, revision of tsunami hazard maps, and 
new plans for a city design after a tsunami, this complex propagation pattern should be considered and 
informed to people. The knowledge in this study also needs to be considered in the design of tsunami 
protection and mitigation systems in a city.  
5. SUMMARY 
The following conclusions and recommendations were obtained by this study: 
1) The flow overtopping embankments occurred mainly on the outer bank side of meandering river 
sections. Severe erosion occurred on the levee slope, and neighbouring houses were washed out by 
the scouring due to the overtopping flow.  
2) In the hinterlands of coast and river embankment, it is necessary to identify locations where a 
tsunami can easily overtop for different tsunami conditions, and the information should be utilized for 
making next hazard map.  
3) The tsunami inundation patterns were complex and could be classified based on the river capacity, 
the existence of gate, and whether a river or sea embankment was breached or not. 
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